



Trends in Executive Compensation

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Lawyers • Patent and Trade-mark Agents



Illustration by David Parkins for the Globe and Mail.
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The Headlines



The Headlines *Cont'd*



Global Focus on Excessive Risk Taking

- **Executive compensation considered a contributing factor to the financial crisis**
- **Public pressure to re-evaluate executive pay policies and constrain compensation practices**
- **Pressure greatest on banks and other financial institutions**
- **Constraints migrating into other companies' governance policies**

FSF Risk Alignment Principles

Principle: compensation outcomes must be symmetric with risk outcomes

- **Compensation adjusted for risks employees take on behalf of the company (including liquidity risk, reputation risk and cost of capital)**
- **Variable compensation for senior executives considered more risk-aligned when deferred**

FSF Risk Alignment Principles *Cont'd*

Principle: compensation payout schedules must be sensitive to the time horizon of risks

- **Grants sensitive to risk outcomes over a multi-year horizon and differ across employees who expose the company to risks of different duration**
- **“Golden handshakes” and multi-year guaranteed bonuses are not in line with principle**
- **Departure of employee should not trigger early payout**

Treasury Secretary Geithner's Principles:

- Ensure pay reflects corporate performance using standards beyond the company's stock price
- Base compensation on long-term performance, and ask executives to hold stock for longer periods of time
- Give corporate risk managers more authority to prevent excessive risk-taking
- Re-examine retirement packages
- Provide transparency and accountability in how compensation committees set pay

OSFI (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions):

- Intends to review executive compensation packages as part of broader assessment of risk-management systems (focus on risks not levels)
- Will apply FSF Principles (no decision has been taken to develop additional guidelines)

Bank of Canada:

- Mark Carney disappointed by “pushback” against reforms
- Concern with return to paying out large bonuses before the world economy is back on track
- “Maybe regulators will decide”

Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG)

- **CCGG represents Canada's largest institutional shareholders**
- **Focus on pay for performance and risk controls (link compensation and risk management)**
- **“Performance” based on measurable criteria that is risk-adjusted and matched to the time horizon needed to ensure the criteria have been met**
- **Movement away from stock options to stock ownership (executives should be required to hold equity positions in the company)**

Canadian Coalition for Good Governance *Cont'd*

- **Severance:**
 - Termination for failure to meet performance targets should not result in a large severance settlement
- **Change of control:**
 - Should have a “double trigger” requirement: (1) actual change of control and (2) executive terminated during a specified time after the change of control

- **Shareholders' annual, nonbinding votes on top executives' compensation**
- **Major Canadian banks and some public companies moving to offer shareholders non-binding say-on-pay vote**
- **Directors are unlikely to ignore the message**
- **Clear communication of rationale behind executive compensation arrangements is needed**

“Risk-Aligned” Compensation

Summary:

- Share awards considered superior to options
- Recommend placing cash and equity grants “in escrow” with clawbacks for poor performance
- Require longer performance periods: defer payments until profits and risks related to individual’s performance are known

Non-Tax Issues

- **Legal questions regarding clawback mechanisms**
- **Performance sensitivity creates more complexity and conflicts with demand for simple understandable plans**
- **Regulatory difficulties in controlling pay**
- **Competition for top talent**
- **Environment for boards and compensation committees becoming more difficult**

- **Canadian tax rules and policies are inconsistent with “risk-aligned” deferral of compensation:**
 - Stock options are most tax-effective method but considered inferior under risk-aligned analysis
 - Salary deferral arrangement (SDA) rules penalize deferral of cash awards beyond 3 years
 - Clawbacks have particularly harsh tax consequences - forfeited amounts are generally not deductible from income

- **Placing deferred amounts “in escrow” does not provide relief from SDA immediate income inclusion**
- **SDA definition covers conditional rights as well as absolute rights**
- **CRA broadly interprets the SDA rules: “plans designed to circumvent the SDA rules by purporting to involve a substantial risk of forfeiture will fail”**
- **If in fact a deferral of income, CRA presumes that one of the main purposes is to defer tax**

Long-Term Incentive Plan

Performance Appreciation Rights:

- SDA rules can be avoided by awarding rights to receive amounts that relate only to future services rendered over a multi-year horizon after the time of grant
- Future payments based on appreciation in value of the business measured by specified financial performance and adjusted for risks the employee takes on behalf of the company

Performance Vesting:

- Vesting criteria not just time based
- Must reach specified performance levels and satisfy risk management factors
- Criteria established at the time of grant

- **Restricted Stock Held in Trust:**
 - Restricted stock results in an immediate taxable benefit at the time it is acquired even if there is a substantial risk of forfeiture - capital loss on forfeiture cannot be applied to offset benefit included in income
- **Alternative:**
 - If shares are held in trust until certain conditions are satisfied there will be a deduction for employees if shares are forfeited as a result of employee not meeting the conditions

Restricted Share Units

RSUs Settled with Equity:

- RSU/Phantom share: right granted to receive value of one share at a future date (proxy for shares of employer)
- RSUs settled in cash are limited to 3-year deferral under SDA rule and RSUs settled in shares come under stock option rules
- If providing for settlement in treasury shares the deferral period can be extended under stock option rules
- Upon settlement of RSUs, employee will be taxed on fair market value of shares (or cash) received

Deferred Share Units

- Exempt from SDA treatment if DSU plan satisfies conditions of regulation 6801(d)
- Participant taxed when amounts received under DSU plan after death, retirement or termination of service
- If director elects to replace fees with DSUs, must make election before entitled to receive fees to avoid constructive receipt
- Cannot be easily or quickly wound up

Repricing Options

- Institutional investors take firm position against repricing
- Securities law issues
- Some companies adopting option exchange programs
- Paragraph 110(1)(d): deduction can be preserved

Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (“SERPs”)

- **CCGG concerned that SERPs may be used as a form of non-performance linked compensation**
- **Cannot avoid characterization as SDA simply by referring to benefits as pension or retiring allowance**

Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (“SERPs”)

- **CRA May 2007:**
 - although a SERP may be a plan to pay pension benefits it will be subject to SDA rules if supplemental pension benefits are “unreasonable”
- **2008 CRA Roundtable:**
 - supplemental pension benefits reasonable if terms apply to beneficiaries of underlying RPP and provide for substantially same benefits in type and quantum

Thank You

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